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How to Modify (Implicit) Evaluations
of Fear-Related Stimuli: Effects of
Feature-Specific Attention Allocation
Jolien Vanaelst*, Adriaan Spruyt and Jan De Houwer
Department of Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
We demonstrate that feature-specific attention allocation influences the way in which
repeated exposure modulates implicit and explicit evaluations toward fear-related
stimuli. During an exposure procedure, participants were encouraged to assign selective
attention either to the evaluative meaning (i.e., Evaluative Condition) or a non-evaluative,
semantic feature (i.e., Semantic Condition) of fear-related stimuli. The influence of
the exposure procedure was captured by means of a measure of implicit evaluation,
explicit evaluative ratings, and a measure of automatic approach/avoidance tendencies.
As predicted, the implicit measure of evaluation revealed a reduced expression of
evaluations in the Semantic Condition as compared to the Evaluative Condition.
Moreover, this effect generalized toward novel objects that were never presented
during the exposure procedure. The explicit measure of evaluation mimicked this effect,
although it failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. No effects were
found in terms of automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. Potential implications for
the treatment of anxiety disorders are discussed.
Keywords: feature-specific attention allocation, selective attention, spider fear, implicit evaluation, extinction
INTRODUCTION
Attitudes drive behavior (Allport, 1935) and are therefore often targeted as a leverage point
for behavioral change. Importantly, behavior is determined not only by carefully constructed
opinions of what we like or dislike but also by spontaneous evaluations that can take place under
automaticity conditions (Fazio, 1990; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). To promote behavioral change,
it may thus be beneficial or even necessary to develop intervention strategies that allow for a
change of these implicit evaluations. In line with this reasoning, it has been demonstrated that
experimentally induced changes in the automatic evaluation of alcohol-related stimuli can result
in a corresponding change in alcohol consumption (e.g., Houben et al., 2010). Similar findings have
been reported in the domain of implicit self-esteem (e.g., Baccus et al., 2004; Conner and Barrett,
2005; Clerkin and Teachman, 2010), consumer research (e.g., Gibson, 2008) and social cognition
(e.g., Rydell and McConnell, 2006).
In the present research, we examined the viability of a novel strategy to reduce implicit
evaluations toward fear-related stimuli. This new approach is based on the observation that
automatic evaluative stimulus processing is dependent upon feature-specific attention allocation
(FSAA), that is, the amount of attention assigned to a specific stimulus feature such as
valence, threat-value, gender, size, etc. As an example, consider the evaluative priming studies
by Spruyt et al. (2009; for related findings see Spruyt et al., 2012, 2015; Spruyt, 2014;
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Spruyt and Tibboel, 2015; see also Kiefer and Brendel, 2006;
Kiefer and Martens, 2010). Evaluative priming studies typically
consist of a series of trials in which participants are asked to
respond to a target stimulus (e.g., a picture of a cute baby)
that is preceded by a briefly presented prime stimulus (e.g., a
picture of a spider). Crucially, the evaluative congruence of the
prime-target pairs is manipulated: whereas both stimuli share
the same evaluative connotation on some trials (e.g., a positive
prime followed by a positive target), other trials consist of
incongruent prime-target pairs (e.g., a positive prime followed
by a negative target). A typical observation is a performance
benefit in speed and/or accuracy for congruent trials relative to
incongruent trials. This effect can come about only if participants
process the evaluative tone of the primes and can therefore
be used as an index of stimulus evaluation. Despite numerous
studies attesting to the unconditional, automatic nature of this so-
called ‘evaluative priming effect’ (see Klauer and Musch, 2003),
Spruyt and colleagues demonstrated that the occurrence of this
effect is restricted to conditions that maximize selective attention
for the evaluative stimulus dimension. Moreover, adding to
the generality of the FSAA framework, a number of recent
studies confirmed that FSAA exerts similar effects on various
other behavioral (Everaert et al., 2013a) and neuropsychological
markers (Everaert et al., 2013b) of implicit evaluation.
Based on the FSAA framework, one can identify two different
pathways to reduce implicit evaluations toward fear-related
stimuli. First, it may be hypothesized that experimentally induced
changes in FSAA at time 1 can determine the likelihood that one
engages in automatic processing of a stimulus feature at time 2.
More specifically, the FSAA framework naturally predicts that
evaluative responses toward fear-related stimuli at time 2 are less
likely to come about in individuals who have learned to refrain
from evaluative stimulus processing at time 1. Second, the impact
of FSAA upon implicit evaluations may be exploited as a means
to increase the efficacy of an extinction treatment. Research has
repeatedly shown that evaluative responses are highly resistant
to extinction (Craske, 1999; De Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann
et al., 2010; Hallion and Ruscio, 2011; Krypotos et al., 2015).
This resistance-to-extinction could be due to the fact that,
during an extinction treatment, the attitude object automatically
evokes an evaluative response that consistently reaffirms the
information acquired during the preceding evaluative learning
episodes (Martin and Levey, 1978; Lewicki et al., 1992). The
FSAA framework predicts, however, that an encounter with an
attitude object is less likely to result in an evaluative response
if attention is directed away from the evaluative stimulus
dimension, thereby allowing for a potential disconfirmation of
the preceding evaluative learning episodes (e.g., Lovibond, 2011,
see also Sanbonmatsu et al., 2007). Accordingly, one may predict
that the extinction rate of evaluative responses toward fear-
related stimuli must be contingent upon the degree to which
attention is assigned to other, non-evaluative (semantic) stimulus
features.
To shed light on these issues, we conducted an exposure
study in which FSAA was either directed toward or away from
the evaluative stimulus dimension during the exposure phase.
Participants were presented with a series of real-life pictures,
the content of which varied along two orthogonal semantic
dimensions: valence (positive vs. negative) and animacy (living
vs. non-living). Participants were asked to categorize all stimuli
either as living vs. non-living (i.e., the Semantic Condition) or as
positive vs. negative (i.e., the Evaluative Condition). Participants
in the Semantic Condition were thus encouraged to assign
selective attention to the non-evaluative semantic features of
the stimulus materials whereas participants in the Evaluative
Condition were encouraged to assign selective attention to the
evaluative tone of the stimulus materials. Crucially, the category
of negative, living stimuli included pictures of spiders only,
thereby allowing for a test of the hypothesis that a manipulation
of FSAA can be exploited as a means to reduce evaluations toward
fear-related stimuli.
To register the impact of this intervention strategy, we
used both a measure of implicit evaluation (i.e., the Affect
Misattribution Paradigm; Payne et al., 2005) and explicit
evaluative ratings. In addition, because positive and negative
evaluations are assumed to promote automatic approach and
avoidance behavior, respectively (Solarz, 1960; Krieglmeyer
et al., 2010), we also included a Relevant–Stimulus Response
Compatibility task aimed at capturing these motivational
response tendencies (i.e., the R–SRC task; Mogg et al., 2003).
We hypothesized that each of these measures would reveal less
negative evaluations toward spiders in the Semantic Condition
as compared to the Evaluative Condition. In addition, we
included (novel) exemplars that were not presented during the
exposure phase to examine the extent to which the impact of our
manipulation would generalize to novel (transfer) stimuli.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Sixty-one students of Ghent University (13 men, 48 women)
participated in the experiment and received 5€ in exchange for
their help. In total, two participants in the Evaluative Condition
and two participants in the Semantic Condition were excluded
from analysis. One participant was excluded due to a technical
error. Two other participants were excluded because their error
rates in the R–SRC task (i.e., 22.66 and 21.09%) exceeded the
outlier criterion of 2.5 standard deviations above the sample
mean (M = 8.49%, SD = 4.69%). Finally, one participant was
excluded because her mean reaction time in the R–SRC task (i.e.,
992 ms) exceeded the outlier criterion of 2.5 SDs above the grand
mean (M = 713 ms, SD= 100 ms). Unless otherwise mentioned,
results were not contingent upon inclusion or exclusion of these
participants. The final sample consisted of 11 men and 46 women
ranging between 18 and 36 years of age (M = 23.39, SD = 3.27).
Power analyses revealed that, given this sample size, the power to
detect a small effect (i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.2), a medium-sized effect
(i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.5), or a large effect (i.e., Cohen’s d = 0.8) was
12.46, or 0.84, respectively. The reported research was conducted
in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional ethics
committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later
amendments. All participants gave their informed consent prior
to their inclusion in the study.
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Materials
The stimulus materials used for the main dependent measures
were eight positive and eight negative color pictures (328 pixels
wide and 246 pixels high), 13 of which (i.e., eight positive and
five negative) were chosen based on norm data collected by
Spruyt et al. (2002). Several of these pictures originated from
the International Affective Picture System (i.e., IAPS; Lang et al.,
1999). On a scale ranging from −5 (“very negative”) to +5
(“very positive”), the mean valence rating of the negative stimuli
was significantly smaller than zero, M = −2.08, SD = 1.05,
t(4) = −4.44, p < 0.05. The mean valence rating of positive
stimuli was significantly larger than zero, M = 2.00, SD = 0.72,
t(7) = 7.85, p < 0.001. In addition to these IAPS pictures, three
pictures of spiders were included. The final sample of 16 stimuli
varied on two orthogonal semantic dimensions (i.e., valence
and animacy), creating four stimulus categories. The category
of living, negative stimuli was represented by four pictures of
spiders. Each of the other three categories was represented by a
mixture of pictures depicting different themes (see Appendix).
For each individual participant, these 16 pictures were split in
two semi-random subsets, each consisting of two pictures from
each stimulus category. One of these subsets was used during
the exposure phase of the experiment (hereafter referred to as
experimental stimuli). The second set was used to test for transfer
effects after the exposure phase (hereafter referred to as transfer
stimuli).
For the AMP, 200 different Chinese pictographs served as
target stimuli. All Chinese pictographs were presented in white
and were 256 pixels wide and 256 pixels high. During the R–
SCR task, participants were asked to make a (white) manikin
move away or toward the stimuli presented in the center of the
computer screen (see below). The manikin was about 51 pixels
wide and 79 pixels high.
All computer tasks were run on a Dell Optiplex GX520
computer. An Affect 4.0 program (Spruyt et al., 2010) controlled
the presentation of the stimuli as well as the registration of
the responses. All stimuli were presented against the black
background of a 19 inch computer monitor (100 Hz).
For exploratory reasons, we also administered a series of
questionnaires. First, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS,
Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995) was used to measure levels
of depression, anxiety and stress in the week preceding the
experiment. The DASS consists of 42 statements (e.g., I found
it difficult to relax) which are to be rated on a four-point Likert
Scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much). The internal
consistency of the DASS is typically very good, with Cronbach’s
alpha’s for the different subscales ranging between 0.83 and 0.91
(de Beurs et al., 2001). In the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha’s
were 0.86, 0.89, and 0.88 for the anxiety, stress, and depression
subscales, respectively. Second, to capture the extent to which
participants tended to experience, on average, a positive or
negative mood, they were asked to complete the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedules (PANAS, Watson and Clark, 1988).
Each mood scale included 10 mood descriptors (e.g., proud,
guilty) and participants were asked to rate each item on a five-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). The
internal consistency of the PANAS is high, both for the English
version (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equal or larger than 0.80; Watson
and Clark, 1988) and the Dutch version (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s
equal or larger than 0.79; Engelen et al., 2006). In the present
sample, Cronbach’s alpha equaled 0.85 for the positive subscale
and 0.78 for the negative subscale. Third, to capture state anxiety,
participants completed the Dutch version of the state anxiety
subscale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S, Spielberger
et al., 1970; Van der Ploeg et al., 1980). Each item of the STAI-
S (e.g., I feel frightened) was scored on a four-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Both the original and
the Dutch version of the STAI-S exhibit good internal consistency
(i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equals or larger than 0.89; Van der Ploeg
et al., 1980; Barnes et al., 2002). In the present sample, Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.92. Finally, the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ,
Szymanski and Donohue, 1995) was administered to assess spider
fear. The FSQ consists of 18 statements (e.g., I do anything to
avoid a spider) which are to be rated on an eight-point Likert scale
ranging from 0 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
Both Szymanski and Donohue (1995) and Muris and Merkelbach
(1996) reported very high internal consistency estimates for the
FSQ (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha’s equal or larger than 0.92). Likewise,
Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample equaled 0.97.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of an exposure phase followed by an
assessment phase (see Figure 1). During the exposure phase, the
experimental stimuli were each presented 8 times in a random
order (i.e., 64 trials). Participants were randomly assigned to
either the Evaluative Condition (n = 28) or the Semantic
Condition (n = 29). Participants assigned to the Evaluative
Condition were asked to categorize these stimuli on the basis of
their evaluative meaning (i.e., positive vs. negative). Participants
assigned to the Semantic Condition were asked to categorize
these stimuli in terms of the animacy dimension (i.e., living or not
living). Selective attention for the evaluative stimulus dimension
was thus maximized in the Evaluative Condition and minimized
in the Semantic Condition.
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross
for 500 ms. Next, after an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms,
a stimulus was presented until a response was registered.
Participants in the Evaluative Condition pressed the left key
if the stimulus was negative and the right key if the stimulus
was positive. Participants in the Semantic Condition pressed the
left key if the stimulus depicted an object and the right key if
the stimulus depicted a living creature. In case of an erroneous
response, a 500-ms error message (i.e., ‘FOUT!’)1 appeared. The
inter-trial interval varied randomly between 500 and 1500 ms.
During the subsequent measurement phase, participants first
completed an AMP, modeled after the recommendations of Payne
et al. (2005). Both the experimental stimuli and the transfer
stimuli were used as primes and were presented once in an
intermixed, random order (i.e., 16 trials in total). It may be
noted that we deliberately chose to implement a small number of
AMP trials as the AMP requires participants to evaluate stimuli.
Using a higher number of trials might thus have interfered
1The Dutch word ‘FOUT’ translates to the English word ‘WRONG.’
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of the experimental procedure.
with the attention manipulation. Each trial started with the
presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by an inter-
stimulus interval of 500 ms and a 75-ms presentation of a prime
stimulus. Next, 125 ms after the offset of the prime stimulus, a
randomly selected Chinese pictograph was presented for 100 ms.
Finally, immediately following the presentation of the Chinese
pictograph, a black-and-white masking stimulus was presented
until a response was registered. Participants were instructed to
press the left key if they considered the Chinese pictograph to be
less pleasant than the average Chinese pictograph and the right
key if they considered the Chinese pictograph to be more pleasant
than average. The inter-trial interval varied randomly between
500 and 1500 ms.
Following the AMP, participants were asked to rate the
evaluative meaning of the experimental and the transfer stimuli
using a rating scale ranging from −100 to +100. Each stimulus
was presented until a response was triggered and the trial list
was completely random. The inter-trial interval varied randomly
between 500 and 1500 ms.
Next, participants completed the R–SRC-task, modeled after
Spruyt et al. (2013). On each trial, either an experimental stimulus
or a transfer stimulus was presented in the middle of the
computer screen. Simultaneously, a manikin was presented either
below or above the position of the stimulus (i.e., counterbalanced
across trials and individual stimuli). During a first block of trials,
participants were asked to move the manikin away from positive
stimuli and toward negative stimuli (i.e., incongruent trials) using
the arrow keys of a standard computer keyboard. In a second
block of trials, participants were asked to move the manikin away
from negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli (i.e., congruent
trials). They were allowed to move the manikin in any direction,
but a loud beeping sound was delivered if the initial movement of
the manikin was incorrect. A trial ended if the manikin reached
either its highest or its lowest possible position in the accurate
direction (i.e., the upper/lower edge of the computer or picture,
10 steps in each direction). Each stimulus was presented exactly
twice during each block, leading to a total of 64 trials. The
inter-trial interval varied randomly between 500 and 1500 ms.
Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants were asked
to complete the FSQ, STAI-S, DASS, and PANAS (fixed order).
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses revealed that none of the critical effects was
qualified by an interaction with stimulus type (i.e., experimental
versus transfer stimuli) or animacy (i.e., living versus non-living
stimuli), all F’s < 2.70. Accordingly, the data were collapsed
across these variables. Note, however, that summary statistics for
each cell of the design are provided in Table 1.
AMP scores were calculated by subtracting the proportion
of pleasant judgments on trials depicting negative stimuli from
the proportion of pleasant judgments on trials depicting positive
stimuli. Likewise, evaluative rating scores were calculated by
subtracting the mean rating of negative stimuli from the mean
rating of positive stimuli. For the R–SRC task, individual scores
were obtained using the so-called D600 algorithm (Greenwald
et al., 2003). First, all reaction times slower than 300 ms and
higher than 10,000 ms were removed (0.16%). Second, for each
block of trials, reaction times observed on error trials (8.47%)
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TABLE 1 | Mean scores for dependent measures as a function of Condition (SD’s in parentheses).
Condition Stimulus type
Experimental stimuli Transfer stimuli
All stimuli Living creatures Objects Living creatures Objects
AMP scores
Semantic 0.07 (0.36)∗∗ −0.03 (0.63)∗ 0.10 (0.52)† 0.12 (0.55)† 0.10 (0.54)∗∗
Evaluative 0.42 (0.47)∗∗ 0.41 (0.65)∗ 0.38 (0.66)† 0.38 (0.55)† 0.52 (0.55)∗∗
Evaluative ratings
Semantic 118.38 (30.55) 126.78 (54.53) 106.47 (30.21) 128.34 (40.24) 111.91 (37.87)
Evaluative 131.29 (30.77) 137.55 (41.29) 121.34 (39.18) 138.36 (37.78) 127.89 (36.73)
R–SRC Scores (D600)
Semantic 0.46 (0.44) 0.71 (0.67)† 0.44 (0.68) 0.47 (0.54) 0.42 (0.56)
Evaluative 0.49 (0.36) 0.42 (0.59)† 0.62 (0.67) 0.35 (0.53) 0.67 (0.72)
†p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
were replaced by the mean of correct latencies plus a 600-ms
penalty. Third, a pooled SD was calculated based on correct
trials and corrected error trials. Fourth, the mean response
latency observed on congruent trials was subtracted from the
mean response latency observed on incongruent trials. Finally,
this difference score was divided by the pooled SD. For all
dependent measures, higher values correspond with a more
marked difference between positive and negative stimuli.
A bootstrapping approach was adopted to examine the
reliability of the AMP effect and the R–SRC effect. For each
measure and for each of 10,000 runs, the data of each individual
participant were split in two equally sized, random sets. Two
AMP scores and two R–SRC scores were then calculated, one
for each subset. Next, for each measure and for each individual
run, the correlation between the two scores was computed and
Spearman–Brown corrected. The split-half reliability coefficient
was then obtained by computing the average of these 10,000
correlations. For the AMP effect, the split-half reliability
coefficient equaled 0.76. The split-half reliability coefficient for
the R–SRC effect was 0.71.
Overall, each of the three dependent measures revealed a
more favorable evaluation of positive stimuli as compared to
negative stimuli, t(56)= 4.08, p < 0.001, d = 0.54, t(56)= 30.30,
p < 0.001, d = 4.01, t(56) = 9.02, p < 0.001, d = 1.19, for
the AMP, the evaluative ratings and the R–SRC, respectively.
More importantly, a one-way ANOVA with Condition as a
between subjects factor revealed that the AMP scores were
reliably different in both conditions, F(1,55) = 9.74, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.15. Follow-up analysis revealed a significant AMP effect
in the Evaluative Condition, t(27) = 4.70, p < 0.001, d = 0.89,
but not in the Semantic Condition, t(28) = 1.10, p = 0.28,
d = 0.20. Numerically, the rating data mimic these results, but
the main effect of Condition failed to reach statistical significance,
F(1,55)= 2.53, p= 0.12, η2= 0.042. In contrast, the R–SRC scores
2It may be noted that the rating data did reveal a significant main effect
of Condition if outlying data points were not excluded from the analyses,
F(1,58) = 4.37, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.07. As anticipated, the difference in mean
valence ratings between positive and negative stimuli was larger in the Evaluative
Condition (M = 131.93) compared to the Semantic Condition (M = 113.69).
did not reveal a reliable difference between the two conditions,
F < 1 (see Table 1).
For each of the dependent measures (i.e., evaluative ratings,
AMP scores and R–SRC scores), we also examined whether the
effect of the attention manipulation was moderated by inter-
individual differences as measured by the questionnaires. While
there was no evidence for such a moderation for the PANAS,
the DASS, and the STAI-S, all F’s < 1, an ANCOVA did reveal
a significant interaction between the Condition factor and the
FSQ score, at least for the AMP data, F(1,53) = 4.72, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.08. Reassuringly, more extreme levels of spider fear were
associated with a more pronounced difference in AMP Scores
between the Evaluative and the Semantic Condition. A similar
effect did not emerge for the evaluative ratings and the R–SRC
data.
Finally, correlational analyses revealed a significant
correlation (r = 0.36) between the AMP scores and the
evaluative ratings, t(55) = 2.86, p < 0.01. In contrast, neither
the AMP scores nor the evaluative ratings correlated with the
R–SRC scores, ts < 1. Interestingly, the correlation between the
FSQ scores and the AMP scores was substantial in the Evaluative
Condition, r = 0.47, t(26) = 2.70, p < 0.05. More extreme levels
of spiders fear were associated with more extreme AMP Scores.
The correlation between the AMP scores and the FSQ scores did
not reach significance in the Semantic Condition, r = 0.06, t < 1.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present research was to test the viability
of a new method to reduce the negativity of the (implicit)
evaluation of fear-related stimuli. Based on the FSAA-framework
developed by Spruyt et al. (2007, 2009; Everaert et al., 2013a),
it was hypothesized that the requirement to engage in a
non-evaluative processing style during an exposure procedure
would impact measures of evaluation during a subsequent
measurement phase, for two reasons. First, the attentional focus
on non-evaluative stimulus information may carry over from the
exposure phase to the test phase, thereby reducing the likelihood
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and/or intensity of the evaluative response toward fear-related
stimuli. Second, participants may be more likely to experience
corrective emotional information during an exposure procedure
if the likelihood and/or intensity of an evaluative response is
minimized during the exposure phase.
To obtain a proof-of-principle for these ideas, we conducted
an exposure study in which participants were asked to
categorize fear-related pictures (e.g., pictures depicting spiders)
either in terms of their evaluative meaning (i.e., Evaluative
Condition) or in terms of the animacy dimension (i.e.,
Semantic Condition). Participants were thus encouraged to
assign selective attention to the evaluative and non-evaluative
semantic features of stimuli, respectively. In line with our
predictions, we observed that implicit evaluations as measured
by the AMP were less pronounced in the Semantic Condition
as compared to the Evaluative Condition, both for stimuli
used during the manipulation phase and novel transfer stimuli.
A similar result was obtained with the explicit evaluative ratings,
although it must be noted that this effect was statistically
not unequivocal (p = 0.12, but see Footnote 1). Given that
the AMP and the explicit evaluative ratings were substantially
correlated, however, we are inclined to attribute the absence
of a reliable effect in the explicit valence ratings to a Type-II
error.
Interestingly, we also observed that the correlation between
the AMP scores and the FSQ scores (i.e., an explicit measure of
spider fear) was dependent upon our experimental manipulation.
Whereas a strong correlation was found in the Evaluative
Condition (r = 0.47), there was no evidence for such a
relationship in the Semantic Condition (r = 0.06). This finding
strengthens our claim that FSAA can modulate the automatic
evaluation of fear-related stimuli as it suggests that individual
differences in automatic evaluation were picked up reliability by
the AMP in the Evaluative Condition but not in the Semantic
Condition.
The current findings are important because they shed new
light on the mixed results that have been reported in the field
of Attention Bias Modification (i.e., ABM; MacLeod et al.,
2002; Hertel and Mathews, 2011; Beard et al., 2012). In a
typical ABM procedure, participants are encouraged to divert
their spatial attention away from fear-related stimuli using
an adapted version of the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al.,
1986). Participants are presented with two briefly presented
stimuli (i.e., cues), one of which is a fear-relevant stimulus
whereas the other is emotionally neutral. On the majority of the
trials, the emotionally neutral stimulus is replaced by a visual
probe that requires a response. On the remaining trials, the
probe is preceded by the fear-related stimulus. It is expected
that the predictive relationship between the nature of the cue
and the probe causes participants to selectively direct their
spatial attention away from threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007), thereby promoting therapeutic change. Whereas several
studies attesting to the therapeutic value of ABM training
have appeared in the literature (e.g., Amir et al., 2008), some
authors reported that they were unable to obtain supporting
evidence for the idea that ABM training can reduce attention
bias and subsequent vulnerability to psychological stressors
(e.g., Julian et al., 2013). Recent meta-analytical studies also
raised concern about the therapeutic efficacy of ABM training
(Hallion and Ruscio, 2011; Mogoas¸e et al., 2014; Heeren et al.,
2015).
Importantly, this mixed pattern of results is readily accounted
for on the basis of the FSAA framework. According to
this framework, different stimulus dimensions attract attention
as a function of current goals and task demands. In a
traditional ABM training, attending to the threat value of
the cues is beneficial for the task at hand as soon as the
difference between threatening and neutral cues is predictive
for the location of the target probes. As a result, somewhat
ironically, one can expect participants to assign selective
attention to the difference between threatening and neutral
stimuli as soon as they pick up a contingency between the
threat value of the cues and the location of the targets. The
observation that successful attempts to change attention bias
were not always accompanied by corresponding changes in
symptoms (Browning et al., 2010) or even increased reported
symptomatology (Baert et al., 2010) is consistent with this
viewpoint.
The logic developed here differs from the ABM approach
in the sense that participants are (a) encouraged to assign
spatial attention to fear-relevant stimuli while (b) prioritizing
non-evaluative (semantic) stimulus processing over evaluative
stimulus processing. Likewise, there is a marked difference
between the current approach and the Emotional Processing
Theory (i.e., EPT) of exposure therapy (Foa and Kozak, 1986).
According to EPT, fear is represented in a fear structure that
can be modified only if it is activated. Accordingly, therapeutic
sessions often comprise a controlled confrontation with the
fear-evoking stimulus, either in vivo or in vitro. Therapeutic
change is then expected to occur only if and to the extent that
participants can integrate corrective information during such
an experience. In line with such an approach, the intervention
developed here requires participants to focus spatial attention on
a threat-evoking stimulus. Nevertheless, our approach is novel
in the sense that participants were encouraged to selectively
process non-evaluative instead of evaluative stimulus features.
As demonstrated by the present findings, this approach may
provide an additional means to combat pathological fear, but we
hasten to confirm that more research would be needed to firmly
substantiate this claims.
Further research would also be needed to deal with two
limitations of our study. First, it is insufficiently clear why exactly
the R–SRC task failed to pick up a difference between the
Evaluative Condition and the Semantic Condition. Importantly,
given that the overall R–SRC effect did reach significance in
both conditions (i.e., performance was consistently better in the
compatible block as compared to the incompatible block), we
can safely rule out the possibility that the specific version of the
R–SRC task used in this study was simply unsuited to detect
automatic approach/avoidance tendencies. It also seems unlikely
that a (successful) manipulation of FSAA would selectively
affect the (implicit) evaluation of a stimulus but not the degree
to which this stimulus triggers automatic approach/avoidance
tendencies. After all, the (automatic) evaluation of a stimulus can
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be defined as a necessary precursor of the (automatic) tendency
to approach or to avoidance that stimulus (Deutsch and Strack,
2006; Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006). Therefore, as an
alternative explanation, we suspect that the temporal order of the
implicit measures may have been critical. The AMP was always
performed first, followed by the evaluative rating task and the
SRC task, respectively. We deliberately opted for a fixed order
of assessment tasks because (a) we were primarily interested in
the influence of FSAA on implicit evaluations (i.e., the AMP) and
(b) we wanted to avoid carry-over effects from other tasks while
participants completed the AMP. However, because all three
dependent measures required participants to evaluate stimuli,
one might argue that each of these tasks may have counteracted
the effects of the experimental manipulation to some degree.
As a logical consequence, it could be argued that the effects of
our exposure procedure were abolished by the time participants
completed the R–SRC-task. It would thus be interesting to
replicate the present experiment while counterbalancing the
order of the measurement tasks. Alternatively, it could be
worthwhile to use an adaptation of the R–SRC that is semantically
neutral. For example, participants might be asked to respond on
the basis of the picture format of the target stimuli (e.g., portrait
vs. landscape, see Reinecke et al., 2010).
As a second limitation of our study, one may argue we
restricted our sample to non-clinical, unselected participants. It
thus remains an open question whether the current findings
would replicate in a clinical sample. It may be noted, however,
that the effect of FSAA was slightly larger, not smaller, when the
analyses were restricted to data stemming from participants with
elevated levels of (self-reported) fear of spiders (i.e., FSQ Scores
>55, see Huijding and de Jong (2006), F(1,19)= 15.41, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.45. More research will be necessary, however, to document
the clinical validity of the current findings as well as the life-time
of the extinction effect observed in the present study.
These limitations notwithstanding, our findings support the
idea that (implicit) evaluations become less intense if participants
are encouraged to assign attention to (non-evaluative) semantic
stimulus information. This effect was found for generic evaluative
stimuli and fear-related stimuli alike and transferred to non-
trained exemplars. More research is needed, however, to establish
the generality of this effect, its boundary conditions, and
underlying mechanisms.
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